With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies: The Case For Ending the Alliance with Pakistan

By Vance Trefethen

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Only three years after establishing the US military alliance with Pakistan, President Eisenhower in 1957 said it was QUOTE “perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made. It was a terrible error...”[[1]](#footnote-1) UNQUOTE. Time has proven him right, and today my partner and I will show you why: The United States should significantly reform its policy toward one or more countries in the Middle East.

OBSERVATION 1. Our DEFINITIONS

**Significant**: “large enough to be noticed or have an effect” *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict. 2014* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant)*)*

**Policy**: “a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body” *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict. 2014* [*http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy?show=0&t=1402599657*](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy?show=0&t=1402599657)*)*

**Middle East** is defined in the Turkish Journal of Politics in 2011 as:

Turkish Journal of Politics Vol 2 No. 2, 2011 (Osman Nuri Özalp, Kırklareli University) “Where is the Middle East? The Definition and Classification Problem of the Middle East as a Regional Subsystem in International Relations” <http://tjp.fatih.edu.tr/docs/articles/112.pdf>

In a broad meaning, we can state that the Middle East covers a region from Ethiopia in the south, Turkey in the north, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: Three important FACTS about the Status Quo:

FACT 1. The US-Pakistan alliance. The Obama administration is committed to the US alliance with Pakistan

WALL STREET JOURNAL 2013. (journalist Saeed Shah) 1 Aug 2013 “Kerry Visits Pakistan in Bid to Revive Alliance” <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323997004578641922336567376>

Secretary of State [John Kerry](http://topics.wsj.com/person/K/John-Kerry/7196) sought to mend ties with Pakistan on a visit on Thursday, inviting new Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to meet with President [Barack Obama](http://topics.wsj.com/person/O/Barack-Obama/4328?lc=int_mb_1001) and promising deeper cooperation. On his first trip here as secretary of state, Mr. Kerry offered reassurances that the U.S. wouldn't abandon Pakistan after U.S. combat troops leave neighboring Afghanistan by the end of 2014. "I'm here with a simple message," he said. "The United States is committed to a long-term partnership with the people of Pakistan."

FACT 2. The US and Pakistan are on opposite sides of a war.

Prof. [C. Christine Fair](http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/ccf33/) 2013. (assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, which is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service) Pakistan May Pose the Most Difficult Choices 29 Jan 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/29/questions-for-hagels-confirmation-hearing/pakistan-may-pose-the-most-difficult-choices>

Regardless of the wisdom of that decision, when the United States declared war against the Taliban, it also unwittingly declared a proxy war against Pakistan. The Taliban have been and remain Pakistan’s best instrument to ensure that India will be kept out of Afghanistan's Pasthun-dominated southern and eastern provinces. Pakistan has long [feared](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/01/taliban-afghanistan-pakistan_n_1246234.html) that India will use any presence in those provinces to foment unrest in Pakistan’s restive Balochistan and tribal areas that abut Afghanistan.

END QUOTE. That leads to…

OBSERVATION 3. The PLAN, to be implemented by Congress, the President, and the State Department.

1. The US ends its alliance and all military aid and cooperation with Pakistan.   
2. Enforcement through normal means. Any government official not in compliance will be disciplined or relieved of duty.  
3. Plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.   
4. Net savings of federal funding, since aid is canceled.

5. Affirmative speeches may clarify the Plan as needed.  
Now let’s see why this is the right policy in…

OBSERVATION 4. The JUSTIFICATIONS

JUSTIFICATION 1. End support for terrorism. We see this in 2 sub-points:

A. The Link: Pakistan is a bad choice for an ally. They actively promote violent Islamic radicalism

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2014. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) Summer 2014 NOTRE DAME MAGAZINE, Lessons From America's War for the Greater Middle East <http://magazine.nd.edu/news/49015/>

The longer America’s War for the Greater Middle East drags on, the more apparent it becomes that Washington has done a lousy job of picking allies. Consider Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, for example. The United States seeks to reduce the prevalence of violent Islamic radicalism. The governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia actively promote it. It’s time to stop pretending otherwise.

B. The Impact: Americans die. Pakistan-sponsored terrorism kills Americans and our allies

Prof. [C. Christine Fair](http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/ccf33/) 2013. (assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, which is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service) Pakistan May Pose the Most Difficult Choices 29 Jan 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/01/29/questions-for-hagels-confirmation-hearing/pakistan-may-pose-the-most-difficult-choices>

Because the United States has been so focused on the war effort in Afghanistan, Washington has frequently turned blind eyes to the dangerous actions of its not-so-allied ally, Pakistan. Since 2002 Pakistan has received more than $25 billion, of which $17 billion was defense assistance to reward its ostensible cooperation in the war on terror. Yet, Pakistan continued to support the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, like the [Haqqani](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/asia/mullen-asserts-pakistani-role-in-attack-on-us-embassy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)network, who are responsible for the deaths of U.S. personnel and their allies, as well as other groups that Washington has proscribed as foreign terrorist organizations.

JUSTIFICATION 2. Mutual Mistrust.

A. The Link: US and Pakistan military don’t trust each other, and thus don’t cooperate well

Associated Press 2011. “Pakistan army rejects US findings on border attack” 23 Dec 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/23/pakistan-army-rejects-us-findings> (brackets added)

He [Brigadier General Stephen Clark, US Air Force special operations officer] acknowledged that the US had not informed Pakistan that American and Afghan commandos were conducting an overnight operation in Afghanistan on 25-26 November when the attack occurred. US and Nato commanders believed that some of their military operations had been compromised when they had given details and locations to the Pakistanis, he said. There was "an overarching lack of trust between the two sides" that keeps them from giving each other specific details on troops or combat outpost locations, Clark said, as he went through a blow-by-blow account of the incident.

B. The Impact: Soldiers die. The Associated Press goes on in the same article to explain the awful impact of the mistrust that led to the disastrous November 2011 air raid, saying QUOTE:

Associated Press 2011. “Pakistan army rejects US findings on border attack” 23 Dec 2011 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/23/pakistan-army-rejects-us-findings>

The Pakistani army has rejected a US investigation that concluded mistakes on both sides led to US air strikes last month that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and severely damaged the already strained relationship between the two countries.

JUSTIFICATION 3. Billions of dollars saved.

Robert Spencer 2011. (Masters degree in religious studies, UNC-Chapel Hill; has led seminars on Islam and jihad for the United States Central Command, United States Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group, the FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the U.S. intelligence community) 3 May 2011 FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE “Pakistan: The Ally That Isn’t” <http://frontpagemag.com/2011/05/03/pakistan-the-ally-that-isnt/#bio>

The death of Osama bin Laden in this fortress in a Pakistani military town suggests that the Pakistani government’s involvement with al-Qaeda is far deeper and more extensive than a few rogue elements of the ISI. Indeed, if Pakistan was sheltering bin Laden for ten years, whether in this particular safe house or in others, then this protection stretches back into Musharraf’s tenure as Pakistani President. Musharraf himself almost certainly knows about it, and has for quite some time – and yet is posturing in the international media today about a deplorable “lack of trust” that the Americans have demonstrated by declining to involve the Pakistanis in the operation against bin Laden. It is long past time to end the fantasy-based policymaking that has counted Pakistan as a U.S. ally for so many years. Imagine the boost to the U.S. economy that could be occasioned by cutting off all aid to Pakistan today, thereby saving billions annually. In that event, the United States would no longer be in the position of being played for a fool by a Pakistani government that is more obviously than ever in league with our enemies, and of funding our own demise.

JUSTIFICATION 4. Collateral damage. US operations have caused death and destruction inside Pakistan

Gen. Imran Malik 2012. (retired Pakistan Army brigadier general, former defence advisor in Australia and New Zealand; graduate of the Command & Staff College, Pakistan and the US Army War College, Pennsylvania) US-Pakistan: Alliance interrupted! 17 Jan 2012 THE NATION <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/columns/17-Jan-2012/us-pakistan-alliance-interrupted>

Consequent to 9/11, President Bush announced the global war on terror (GWOT) and literally bullied President General Pervez Musharraf into joining it. Blatant, unwritten, unilateral deals were struck and the US went wild chasing the militants all over Pakistan, hunting and killing them (and “collateral damage” Pakistanis) at will. This ruthless exploitation of Pakistani President’s political vulnerability led to thousands of Pakistani deaths, the destruction of its infrastructure, the ruination of its economy and the extreme polarisation of its society! Unfortunately, it still goes on!

JUSTIFICATION 5. Dysfunctional government in Pakistan

A. The Link: US support enables the Pakistani military’s dysfunctional behavior

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>

In 1957, only several years after heavy U.S. involvement in Pakistan began, President Eisenhower remarked that the military commitment to Pakistan was “perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made. It was a terrible error, but we now seem hopelessly involved in it.” Fifty-four years later, little has happened that would persuade Eisenhower to revise this conclusion. With good intentions, successive administrations and Congresses have colluded with the Pakistani army and intelligence services to maintain their oversized, dysfunctional roles in Pakistan and South Asia. There is no evidence that U.S. blandishments or threats will motivate this security establishment to change its mindset and provide space and resources for Pakistani civilians to create a national identity around internal reconciliation, justice, development, and democratization.

B. The Impacts: Prolonged conflict and the dysfunction of the entire state of Pakistan

Husain Haqqani 2014. (former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, now Boston Univ. College of Arts & Sciences professor of the practice of international relations) quoted by Susan Seligson “BU’s Haqqani Probes Rocky US-Pakistan Alliance“ <http://www.bu.edu/today/2014/haqqani-probes-rocky-us-pakistan-alliance/>

There are three consequences of these mismatched alliances—to prolong India-Pakistan conflict, to make Pakistan increasingly dependent on the United States, and third, to postpone any reform in Pakistan. Not only is the US-Pakistan relationship dysfunctional, it has contributed to increasing the dysfunction of Pakistan as a state.

2A Evidence: End Pakistan Alliance

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

TERRORISM / WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

US has spent $26 billion on Pakistan, while Pakistan undermines US interests and sponsors terrorism

Prof. [C. Christine Fair](http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/ccf33/) 2013. (assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, which is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service) 30 Apr 2013 Can This Alliance Be Saved? Salvaging the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, TIME magazine <http://nation.time.com/2013/04/30/is-salvaging-the-u-s-pakistan-relationship-worth-it/>

Americans are furious, exhausted and befuddled at Islamabad. Over the past decade, the United States has spent poured neatly $26 billion into Pakistan, per the tabulations of the Congressional Research Service. Yet Pakistan has undermined U.S. interests at every turn. It has continued to support the Taliban, who have killed the vast majority of Americans and their allies in Afghanistan. It continues to nurture “jihadi” assets such as Lashkar-e-Taiba/Jamaat ud Dawa (LeT/JuD), whose leader, [Hafez Saeed](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/asia/lashkar-e-taiba-founder-takes-less-militant-tone-in-pakistan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0), is a frequent media commentator and public personality. LeT/JuD, which is responsible for the November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai as well as attacks on U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, openly raises funds and holds rallies in Pakistan and has even enjoyed financial [support](http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/238/it%E2%80%99s-time-to-cut-the-proverbial-cord/) from the Punjab province. Despite professions that it has “clamped down” on sectarian militants slaughtering Pakistanis by the tens of thousands, politicians with [ties](http://dawn.com/2013/03/24/smokers-corner-the-hate-vote/) to such groups are contesting the 2013 election without impediment.

“Pakistan is now fighting terrorists” – Response: Only fighting Taliban of Pakistan. They still support Taliban of Afghanistan and other terrorist groups

Bill Roggio 2014. (managing editor of THE LONG WAR JOURNAL; former active duty soldier in US Army) LONG WAR JOURNAL “Pakistan launches 'comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists' in North Waziristan” 15 June 2014 <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/06/pakistan_launches_co.php#ixzz3AH2RvG12>

It is unlikely that the so-called "good Taliban" groups such as the Haqqani Network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadar Group will be targeted in the operation. The Pakistani state considers the Haqqanis, Bahadar, and the Mullah Nazir Group in South Waziristan to be good Taliban as they do not advocate attacking the Pakistani state and instead direct their forces to fight in Afghanistan. These independent Taliban factions are considered to be strategic depth against the Indians in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is the key ally of the Taliban: Without Pak support, the Taliban would never have recovered from the US invasion of Afghanistan

Bruce Riedel 2013. (senior fellow and director of the [Brookings Intelligence Project](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/intelligence" \t "_blank); senior fellow in the [Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/middle-east-policy" \t "_blank); retired from Central Intelligence Agency; was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four US Presidents; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East & South Asia at the Pentagon and senior advisor at NATO) Pakistan, Taliban and the Afghan Quagmire 24 Aug 2013 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/26-pakistan-influence-over-afghan-taliban-riedel>

After 9/11, American and allied forces intervened in Afghanistan with a UN mandate and toppled the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The defeated Taliban fighters were ordered by Mullah Omar to scatter and avoid further direct confrontation with the enemy while they regrouped. Many just went home. The leadership and the hard core fled south from Kandahar into Pakistan. Most relocated in Baluchistan around the city of Quetta, where Omar himself settled. He began rebuilding his Taliban in exile. By 2004, it resumed the war inside Afghanistan. Pakistan gave it critical help and assistance. Without it, the Taliban would never have recovered. A NATO study published in 2012 based on the interrogations of 4000 captured Taliban, al-Qaeda and other fighters in Afghanistan in over 27,000 interrogations concluded that ISI support was critical to the survival and revival of the Taliban after 2001 just as it was critical to its conquest of Afghanistan in the 1990s. It provides sanctuary, training camps, expertise and help with fund raising. Pakistani officers have been killed on the battlefield in Afghanistan operating under cover with Taliban forces.

NATO commander in the field says Pakistani troops are aiding Afghan insurgent attacks on Americans.

Spencer Ackerman 2011. (journalist) WIRED, “Top General: Pakistani Military Aids Rocket Attacks on U.S. Troops” <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/pakistan-rockets-us-troops/>

Frontline Pakistani troops aid and abet lethal insurgent attacks on American forces across the Afghan border, according to the day-to-day commander of the NATO war effort. It’s a big reason why rocket and mortar attacks have quadrupled since 2010. “You’ll see what just appears to us to be a collaboration or was a collaboration or, at a minimum, looking the other way when insurgents conducted rocket or mortar fire in what we believe to be visual sight of one of their posts,” Lt. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti told Pentagon reporters on Thursday morning.

Pakistan supports terrorism, using US aid money

Robert Spencer 2011. (Masters degree in religious studies, UNC-Chapel Hill; has led seminars on Islam and jihad for the United States Central Command, United States Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army's Asymmetric Warfare Group, the FBI, the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the U.S. intelligence community) 3 May 2011 FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE “Pakistan: The Ally That Isn’t” <http://frontpagemag.com/2011/05/03/pakistan-the-ally-that-isnt/#bio>

It was illustrative of where Pakistan stands in the fight against the global jihad, and where it has stood since September 11, 2001. The U.S. has paid billions to Pakistan since then in order to aid the Pakistani government’s fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban; it has been revealed, however, that much of that money has gone to those same organizations, and that the ISI, Pakistan’s spy service, has significant ties with al-Qaeda.

US government lists Pakistan’s intelligence agency - the “Inter-Services Intelligence” (ISI) -- as a terrorist support entity

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 4 May 2011 “Pakistan, America’s Feckless Ally,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-americas-feckless-ally>

A report last year by the London School of Economics found that elements of the ISI not only fund the Taliban, but are also represented on the militant movement's leadership council. When compared to its tumultuous partnership with the U.S., Pakistan appears to have better working relations with militants who attack America. According to leaked documents from Guantanamo Bay obtained by WikiLeaks, prison detainees associated with the ISI may have provided support to al Qaeda. The September 2007 document, titled "Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants," lists the ISI as one of 65 "terrorist and terrorist support entities."

Alliance with US makes Pak leaders targets for assassination

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 2 Dec 2011 “Digging our grave in AfPak” <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/digging-our-grave-in-af-pak/>

Pakistan’s alliance with the United States has always been a liability. After 9/11, Musharraf forced the reassignment or resignation of officers regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist, because his decision to support U.S. counterterrorism efforts undermined his support among key military officials. In 2003, he narrowly escaped two attempts on his life—within 11 days of each other—that involved the collaboration of junior officers. The attacks came two months after al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released an audiotape urging Pakistanis to overthrow the military general.

MISTRUST

Obama Administration doesn’t trust Pakistan

CBS News 2011. “Pakistan alliance "too big to fail" for U.S.?” 5 May 2011 <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/05/501364/main20060025.shtml>

The bin Laden operation has revealed the shifting ground: The Obama administration trusted its partner so little that it only told the government of the military incursion when it was over. And in a statement Tuesday, the Pakistani government warned that an "unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule," calling it a "threat to international peace and security." It has made clear that it had nothing to do with the operation.

Neither the US nor Pakistan view each other as a reliable ally

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 28 Oct 2011 “Pakistan Does Not Respond to U.S. Pressure,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-does-not-respond-us-pressure>

Neither the United States nor Pakistan views the other as a reliable ally. U.S. officials have tried to sweep this uncomfortable truth under the rug for too long. Colluding with militants, which Pakistan views as vital to its strategic interests, continues to hamper coalition efforts in Afghanistan. But it is time for U.S. officials to accept that no amount of pressure or persuasion will affect Pakistan's decision to tackle militants more vigorously.

Pak army and people are increasingly anti-American

John R. Schmidt 2011. (teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ. He served in senior positions in the State Department during a 30-year foreign service career, including as political counselor in the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in the three years leading up to 9/11) THE NATIONAL INTEREST “Solving a Problem Like Pakistan,” 12 Sept 2011 <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/solving-problem-pakistan-5871>

During the past year, U.S. actions and Pakistani reactions—including incessant drone attacks against Afghan Taliban forces, Pakistani detention of a CIA contractor arrested for killing two ISI informants and the clandestine raid against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad—have brought relations close to the breaking point. Pakistan’s army has become increasingly anti-American, and ordinary Pakistanis now tell pollsters they regard the United States as a greater enemy than India.

WASTED MONEY

US funding for Pakistan hard to justify given lack of results and US economy in trouble

Prof. [C. Christine Fair](http://explore.georgetown.edu/people/ccf33/) 2013. (assistant professor at Georgetown University's Center for Peace and Security Studies, which is part of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service) 30 Apr 2013 Can This Alliance Be Saved? Salvaging the U.S.-Pakistan Relationship, TIME magazine <http://nation.time.com/2013/04/30/is-salvaging-the-u-s-pakistan-relationship-worth-it/>

Equally disconcerting for U.S. interests, Pakistan is busily expanding its nuclear arsenal with a renewed focused upon tactical — [battlefield](http://www.stimson.org/summaries/smith-on-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-south-asia-/) — nuclear weapons.  The final straw was the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, a short distance from Pakistan’s famed Military Academy in Kakul. Americans rightly recount that neither sums of money, conventional weapons systems such as F-16s, or support to civilian institutions has paid the kind of dividends that U.S. legislators and administration officials wanted. With the U.S. economy in a shambolic state, unemployment high and increasing demands for increased development at home, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to justify engaging Pakistan through the checkbook.

US should stop making Pakistan fight America’s battles - and we can stop funding it

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>

Stop Pushing and Funding the Pakistan Army to Fight America’s Battles   
Washington should recognize the futility of demanding that the Pakistan army enter North Waziristan to fight the Haqqani Network and other insurgents who are projecting violence into Afghanistan. Pakistanis see this as America’s war. The army already is overstretched trying to hold other Pakistani territory from which the Pakistani Taliban has been cleared and also contributing to reconstruction from the June 2010 floods. The army therefore will not do what the United States asks. Once Washington stops pressing Pakistan to conduct military operations along the Afghan border, it can also fairly withdraw the pledge of billions of dollars in military assistance that has been tied to Pakistan’s combat operations in this theater. The June announcement that the United States is withholding $800 million slated for such operations reflects this logic. If Pakistanis do not welcome the mission, they do not need the funding for it.

ENABLING DYSFUNCTIONAL PAK MILITARY

We need to stop enabling Pakistan’s security establishment

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>

The eminent Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid trenchantly summarizes the challenge facing Pakistan and those who care about it. “What Pakistanis desperately need is a new narrative by their leaders—a narrative that does not blame the evergreen troika of India, the United States, and Israel for all the country’s ills, that breaks the old habit of blaming outsiders and instead looks at itself more honestly and more transparently.” Psychology is at the heart of the matter. “Pakistanis,” Rashid writes, “as a nation seem incapable of self-analysis, or apportioning blame according to logic and reason rather than emotion.”   
Can Washington Learn?  
If Washington is smart, it will stop enabling the Pakistani security establishment’s dysfunctional domination of state and society and truly help Pakistanis who increasingly realize that the source of their ills is internal. To do this, the administration and Congress must accept the bountiful evidence that behaviorist policies of incentives and punishments will not change the army’s psychology and actions. The army’s and ISI’s obsessions are too neurotic to be affected by American techniques of behavior modification. And it would be exceedingly dangerous for anyone to seek to defeat the army and ISI in war.

Pakistan is dangerously dysfunctional, thanks to us.

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>)

As the United States begins to look to the end of its heavy fighting role in Afghanistan, it needs to confront the more important question of Pakistan’s future. The United States has been a major player there for sixty years; if Pakistan is dangerously dysfunctional, Washington helped enable it to get this way.

Pakistan’s army blames the US for Pakistan’s problems

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf> (brackets added)

In a further effort to shift attention to an external source of threat, [Pakistan army chief of staff General Ashfaq Parvez] Kayani declared that the number of U.S. troops stationed in Pakistan had been “drastically cut down,” and that “no intelligence agency can be allowed to carry out independent operations on our soil.” He closed by insisting that Pakistan has “no room for terrorism,” and that the army will “continue supporting the democratic system without any preference to any particular party.” Mirrored in each part of this remarkably defensive declaration appears an implicit admission of the army’s past policies and roles. Yet the attempt to substitute the United States for India as Pakistan’s bête noir indicates that the army and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence agency] have not given up the habit of relying on an external threat to rally support for the security establishment. Blaming the United States for Pakistan’s problems now could provide more room for Pakistan to try to normalize relations with India, but the statement still positions the army as the most important, privileged institution in the country, against which no opposition will be tolerated. The army will remain more of a problem than a solution in Pakistan’s effort to heal itself. It is incapable of creating a positive national identity or leading political processes to reconcile the myriad internal conflicts that cause Pakistan’s decline.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

We need to get out of the US/Pakistan alliance

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 4 May 2011 “Pakistan, America’s Feckless Ally,” (brackets added) <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-americas-feckless-ally>

Many experts, such as venerated foreign policy expert Michael O'Hanlon, explain away this disquieting reality by arguing in a circle: they insist America needs Pakistan for its operations in Afghanistan by assuming that America's presence in Afghanistan is critical to America's security. Mr. [Michael] O'Hanlon recently justified the necessity of maintaining ties with Pakistan, even as he equated bilateral relations to a bad marriage both parties can't get out of. He argued, "the right approach is to try even harder to make it work." There seems to be more and more evidence, however, that it is worthwhile for America to file for divorce.

Pakistan’s interests don’t coincide with America’s. Pak wants US support so they can compete with India

Husain Haqqani 2014. (former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, now Boston Univ. College of Arts & Sciences professor of the practice of international relations) 3 Feb 2014 quoted by Susan Seligson “BU’s Haqqani Probes Rocky US-Pakistan Alliance“ <http://www.bu.edu/today/2014/haqqani-probes-rocky-us-pakistan-alliance/>

The maxim in international relations is that there are no permanent friends or enemies. There are only national interests. The problem is that Pakistan’s national interest has been defined by its overly dominant military, which was inherited from the British Raj on partition in 1947. That definition does not really coincide with America’s definition of its own interest or what America perceives to be Pakistan’s interest. The American delusion has been that if they just give enough money and arms to Pakistan, it will start feeling sufficiently secure and will stop looking at India as a rival. The Pakistani delusion is that if we get enough money and arms from America, we will be India’s equal.

US alliance and military aid are not helping Pakistan and never will

Husain Haqqani 2014. (former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, now Boston Univ. College of Arts & Sciences professor of the practice of international relations) 3 Feb 2014 quoted by Susan Seligson “BU’s Haqqani Probes Rocky US-Pakistan Alliance“ <http://www.bu.edu/today/2014/haqqani-probes-rocky-us-pakistan-alliance/>

The biggest misconception among American policy makers still remains that America can change Pakistan’s behavior by treating it as an ally and giving more military assistance. It hasn’t worked in the past, and if $40 billion did not change Pakistani policy, more money will not change it either. America needs to encourage Pakistan to look inward, reform its economy, change its educational system, stop costly entanglements in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and get on with life as a normal democracy.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Pakistan can help negotiate with and/or defeat the Taliban” – Response: Don’t hold your breath. They’re not serious about it

Bruce Riedel 2013. (senior fellow and director of the [Brookings Intelligence Project](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/intelligence" \t "_blank); senior fellow in the [Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/middle-east-policy" \t "_blank); retired from Central Intelligence Agency; was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four US Presidents; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East & South Asia at the Pentagon and senior advisor at NATO) The United States and Pakistan: Divided They Stand 28 Oct 2013 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/10/28-united-states-pakistan-riedel> (brackets added)

[Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz] Sharif backed the Afghan Taliban the last time he was in office and rebuffed repeated US requests to try to end its support for al-Qaeda. This year, he has promised to try to encourage the Taliban to come to the peace table with Kabul. Releases of Taliban commanders, arrested in the past because they wanted dialogue, have been carefully staged to give an appearance of substance to the effort. Washington has every reason to encourage Pakistan to use its enormous leverage with the Taliban to open a dialogue with Kabul. So far, it all looks more like subterfuge than reality. It is far from clear that the prime minister has the clout to control the ISI and the army in their dealings with the Taliban. Obama heard positive words about reconciliation from Sharif; the proof will be if the Taliban sit down with Karzai's peace team. Don't hold your breath.

“Afghan war effort” – Response: US and Pakistan are on opposite sides of the Afghan war, Pakistan is helping the Taliban

Bruce Riedel 2013. (senior fellow and director of the [Brookings Intelligence Project](http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/intelligence" \t "_blank); senior fellow in the [Center for Middle East Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/middle-east-policy" \t "_blank); retired from Central Intelligence Agency; was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four US Presidents; former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near East & South Asia at the Pentagon and senior advisor at NATO) 5 June 2013 U.S.-Pakistan Relationship and the Future of Afghanistan <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/05-us-pakistan-relationship-future-afghanistan-riedel>

The U.S. and Pakistan are fundamentally at odds over the future of Afghanistan. Washington and Islamabad back opposite sides in the war and want different outcomes. This despite a new civilian government in Islamabad and a somewhat new counter terrorism policy in Washington. For twenty years Pakistan's army--the real power broker in the country--has backed the Afghan Taliban. It helped create the Taliban's Islamic Emirate in the 1990s and build the al Qaeda state within a state. The army has provided safe haven, arms, expertise and other help to the Taliban. It briefly pretended to abandon the Taliban to avoid American anger in 2001 misleading George Bush. By 2004 under the leadership of its then spy chief and today top general, Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, was deeply engaged in helping the Taliban again. It still is.

“Hurts Afghan war effort” - Response: Afghanistan is not a vital US security interest anyway.

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 4 May 2011 “Pakistan, America’s Feckless Ally,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-americas-feckless-ally>

Pakistan wants to have its cake and eat it too, much like a cheating spouse. And U.S. myopia allows this to happen. Afghanistan is not a vital security interest to the U.S., yet trotting out an endless array of justifications for remaining in Afghanistan increases Pakistan's leverage by allowing it to take advantage of America's dependence.

“Pakistan nukes at risk” - Response: Taliban success/failure will not affect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

In reality, success or failure against the Afghanistan Taliban will not affect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The issues are unrelated. The logic behind the administration’s concern is that militants will have a better chance of acquiring nuclear weapons if they operate from a secure foothold. The stronger the Taliban become in Afghanistan, the more dangerous they will become to Pakistan. And because political instability in Afghanistan is likely to spill across the border, the government in Islamabad will be less capable of stopping them. This logic is wrong. For the reasons discussed above, fear of a safe haven in Afghanistan is wildly exaggerated. Afghan militants may find some protection from U.S. forces by hiding in Pakistan, but Pakistani militants will find no similar refuge in an Afghanistan dominated by Islamic militants.

Current strategy is wrong: We don’t need to build a strong Afghan state and Pak’s nukes aren’t vulnerable to Taliban

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan. Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Policymakers should scale back their ambitions in Afghanistan. If they do so, they could cut troop levels by 80–90 percent while defending core U.S. interests and dramatically reducing the costs to America in both blood and treasure.

Decline of Afghan central state will not be a problem: Al Qaeda will not recreate safe havens and Pak militants won’t find sanctuary there

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

The upshot of this analysis is that state building is not necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. The decline of the central state will not lead to a domino effect in the region. Al Qaeda will not be able to recreate its old safe haven there even if the government collapses. Pakistani militants will not find reliable sanctuary either, regardless of what happens in Kabul.

“Al Qaeda will take over” - Response: Al Qaeda will remain in hiding - no safe haven in Afghanistan

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

A state-building failure would not mean victory for al Qaeda or the Taliban. Even if the United States substantially reduces its ground forces in Afghanistan and the Kabul government remains weak and ineffectual, al Qaeda would not be able to recreate anything like the safe haven it once enjoyed. The original circumstances that made sanctuary possible no longer exist today. In the 1990s there was little domestic support for aggressive U.S. counterterrorism operations abroad, and the Clinton administration debated at length whether to strike large al Qaeda training camps. Today there would be little debate; indeed, the Obama administration would surely welcome the opportunity to conduct strikes against well-defined terrorist strongholds without having to cross over into Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban, which by now is very familiar with U.S. air power, has much to lose by inviting al Qaeda back. As the Afghanistan Study Group aptly concludes, senior al Qaeda leaders “will likely have to remain in hiding for the rest of their lives, which means Al Qaeda will have to rely on clandestine cells instead of large encampments.”

Don’t need to block safe havens for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and don’t need to worry about securing Pak’s nukes

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, policymakers have emphasized two basic national security interests at stake in Afghanistan. The first is preventing al Qaeda and its Taliban allies from reestablishing a safe haven. The second is preventing the violence in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan, thus putting its nuclear forces at risk and increasing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan. Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we continue to operate on the bases of these mistaken beliefs, and the result is that American strategy has become incoherent.

“Pak nukes at risk” - Response: Militants don’t have the capability to pull it off.

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Rather than attacking facilities directly, militants could conceivably try to intercept weapons or fissile material in transit. So far, none of the Pakistani groups have shown anything close to the sophistication and resources needed to pull off such an audacious attack. In any case, a safe haven far away in Afghanistan would not help militants seeking to mass forces inside Pakistan to intercept nuclear weapons.

“Pakistan loose nukes” - Response: Pak nukes are secured

Christopher Clary 2010. (country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; previously served as a research associate in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School) Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Sept 2010 , published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf> (ellipses and parentheses in original)

When questioned in May 2009, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, summarised his views on the topic:  
I remain comfortable that the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are secure, that the Pakistani leadership and in particular the military is very focused on this… We, the United States, have invested fairly significantly over the last three years, to work with them, to improve that security. And we’re satisfied, very satisfied with that progress. We will continue to do that. And we all recognise obviously the worst downside… (is if) those nuclear weapons come under the control terrorists. I don’t think that’s going to happen. I don’t see that in any way imminent whatsoever at this particular point in time. But it is a strategic concern that we all share. And I’m comfortable that the military leadership in particular is capable of dealing with the particular issue right now.  
Also that month, the head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, gave a similar assessment, saying, “With respect to the nuclear weapons and sites that are controlled by Pakistan…, we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.” Both officers apparently reflect the views of President Barack Obama, who has stated, “We have confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals.”

“Pakistan Instability” - Responses:   
1) Not unique - Pakistan on a downward course in Status Quo  
2) US aid not effective

Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman 2011. (Vira - Chicago-based writer on international affairs; Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal) “PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE VS. STABILITY - A National Net Assessment” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives; established in 1962) 5 May 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf>

At present, Pakistan seems to be on a downward course. Its leadership is not adequately addressing either the causes of Pakistan's internal violence, or the needs of its people. Its politics are corrupt and self-serving, and far too many indicators reflect its failure to adopt policies that serve popular needs or meet popular expectations. It is playing a form of the “great game” which forces it to confront India on a region-wide basis and into a nuclear arms race. It has unleashed levels of religious extremism that not only threaten its Shi‟ite minorities but also its moderate Sunni majority. At the same time, it continues a long history of shifting the blame for its own actions to other states, and relying on political rhetoric as a substitute for effective action. This presents major problems for the United States both in finding some favorable outcome to the Afghan conflict, and in helping to create some form of regional stability in South Asia – a greater US strategic interest than the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, US options are limited. US military intervention inside Pakistan is deeply resented by both the Pakistani people and its leadership elite. US military assistance has so far won only grudging and limited support and economic assistance has failed to win broad support or achieve any major objectives.

“Pakistan nukes” – Response: US alliance isn’t needed to promote nuclear responsibility

Prof. Robert E. Kelly 2014. (associate professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Pusan National University ) Unintended Consequences of US Alliances in Asia , THE DIPLOMAT 7 Apr 2014 <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/unintended-consequences-of-us-alliances-in-asia/>

We just assume, for example, that the U.S. presence halts a spiraling nuclear arms race in East Asia, even though that has not happened between India and Pakistan after they both went nuclear in the 1990s. Neither India nor Pakistan has a strong U.S. alliance, nor are they governed as competently as most East Asian states are, but that has not led to the widely feared nuclear spiral between them, suggesting that U.S. reassurance might not actually be necessary for nuclear responsibility in Asia after all.

1. quoted by Dr George Perkovich, 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” [*http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan\_dysfunction.pdf*](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-1)